

























and	 to	 avoid	 doing	 bad.	 In	 this	 study	 we	 examined	 moral	 emotions;	 specifically,	 guilt,	 shame,	
annoyance	and	feeling	“bad”	 from	two	different	perspectives	 in	a	moral	scenario;	 the	agent	and	
the	victim	whilst	manipulating	the	intentionality	of	the	harm;	intentional	and	unintentional.	Two	
hundred	 participants	 completed	 a	 moral	 emotions	 task,	 which	 utilised	 cartoons	 to	 depict	
everyday	moral	scenarios.	As	expected,	we	found	that	self-blaming	emotions	such	as	shame	and	
guilt	were	much	more	frequent	when	taking	on	the	perspective	of	the	agent	whilst	annoyance	was	
more	 frequent	 from	 the	 victim	 perspective.	 Feeling	 bad,	 however,	 was	 not	 agency-specific.	
Notably,	when	 the	harm	was	 intentional,	we	 observed	 significantly	 greater	 shame	 ratings	 from	
the	perspective	of	the	agent	compared	to	when	the	harm	was	unintentional.	In	addition,	we	also	


















that	 this	 affects	 moral	 judgments	 (Greene	 et	 al.,	 2001).	 There	 is	 also	 evidence	 showing	 that	
changing	 the	 emotional	 state	 of	 individuals	 influences	 their	 moral	 judgements.	 For	 example,	
participants	who	watched	a	happy	movie	 in	comparison	to	a	neutral	movie	were	more	 likely	 to	
choose	 the	morally	 ‘appropriate’	 choice	 in	 a	moral	 dilemma	by	 sacrificing	 an	 individual	 for	 the	
greater	 good	 (Valdesolo	 and	 DeSteno,	 2006),	 whereas	 in	 a	 separate	 study	 eliciting	 anger	 led	
participants	 to	 condemn	 justice	 violations	more	harshly	 (Horberg	 et	 al.,	 2011).	The	notion	 that	
emotions	influence	moral	judgements	is	also	consistent	with	the	results	of	neuroimaging	studies,	
which	 have	 shown	 activation	 of	 brain	 regions	 typically	 associated	 with	 emotion	 when	
participants	are	faced	with	moral	dilemmas	(Greene	et	al.,	2001),	everyday	moral	transgressions	
(Seara-Cardoso,	et	al.	2016)	or	pictures	with	moral	content	 (Moll	et	al.,	2002).	Moral	emotional	














a	negative	evaluation	of	 the	self,	whereas	guilt	 refers	 to	a	more	 “private”	experience	associated	
with	 internally-generated	 pangs	 of	 conscience leading	 to	 the	 negative	 evaluation	 of	 a	 specific	
behaviour	 (Tangney	 et	 al.,	 2011).	By	 contrast,	 moral	 anger	 is	 associated	 with	 violations	 of	 the	
rights	of	 individuals	 (Russell	 and	Giner-Sorolla,	 2013)	 and	has	been	previously	 associated	with	
attributions	of	intentionality	and	blame	(Alicke,	2000;	Tetlock	et	al.,	2007).		
	
Moral	 emotions	 differ	 depending	 on	 a	 person’s	 perspective	 of	 the	 moral	 scenario,	 i.e.	 agent,	
victim,	observer	and	whether	the	act	was	 intentional	 	 (Zahn	et	al.,	2012;	Buon	et	al.,	2016).	For	
instance,	guilt	or	shame	result	 from	negative	outcomes	attributed	to	one’s	self,	and	moral	anger	
results	 from	 negative	 events	 attributed	 to	 illegitimate	 acts	 of	 others	 (Lawler	 and	 Thye,	 1999).		





and	 personality.	 For	 instance,	children	 and	 adolescents	 through	 to	 adults	 have	 reportedly	
different	 experiences	 of	 shame	 and	 guilt,	 which	 have	 differential	 consequences	 on	 behaviour	
(Tangney,	 et	 al.,	 2007).	 Research	 also	 suggests	 that	 women	 experience	 higher	 self-conscious	
moral	emotions	such	as	guilt	and	shame	compared	to	men	(Else-Quest	et	al.,	2012).	 In	addition,	






Greenwald,	 1999).	 Finally,	 although	 the	 development	 of	 moral	 reasoning	 is	 often	 linked	 to	
intelligence,	moral	emotions	do	not	rely	on	logic	and	analytical	skills	(Malti	et	al.,	2013;	Malti	and	





the	 victim	 (the	 person	who	 experiences	 the	 consequences	 of	 that	 act)	whilst	manipulating	 the	
intentionality	of	the	harm	caused	in	the	moral	scenario;	intentional	(the	agent	intended	to	cause	
harm)	 or	 unintentional	 (the	 harm	 was	 an	 accident).	 The	 most	 commonly	 explored	 moral	
emotions	are	guilt,	 shame,	embarrassment	and	pride	(Tangney	and	Fischer,	1995),	however	we	
chose	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 negative	 “self-conscious	 emotions”;	 guilt	 and	 shame.	 Whilst	 pride	 is	 a	
positive	moral	 emotion,	 embarrassment	 although	 not	 distinct	 from	 shame,	 is	 often	 difficult	 for	
people	to	separate	(Crozier,	2014).	We	also	chose	to	include	“annoyance”	a	negative	but	not	self-
conscious	non-moral	emotion	and	“feeling	bad”,	a	more	general	 feeling	 for	when	people	cannot	
specify	 a	 distinct	 emotion.	 Our	 objective	 was	 to	 explore	 individuals’	 feelings	 of	 guilt,	 shame,	
annoyance	and	feeling	bad	when	taking	on	the	perspective	of	each	role,	and	further	establish	any	
effects	 of	 gender,	 age	 or	 personality	 traits.	 We	 hypothesised	 that	 shame	 and	 guilt	 would	 be	
greater	 when	 taking	 on	 the	 role	 of	 the	 agent	 compared	 to	 the	 victim	 and	 that	 these	 moral	
emotions	 heightened	 when	 the	 harm	 was	 intentional.	 We	 further	 hypothesised	 a	 distinction	









Inclusion	 criteria	 were	 as	 follows:	 18-50	 years	 old,	 no	 previous	 or	 current	 psychiatric	
disorders,,	 no	 significant	 head	 injury,	 no	 current	 use	 of	medication	 known	 to	 affect	mood	 or	
cognition,	no	first	degree	relatives	suffering	from	any	psychiatric	disorders,	smoking	less	than	5	
cigarettes	per	day,	drinking	 less	 than	the	UK	government	guidelines	 for	weekly	alcohol	 intake	
and	fluent	in	English.	The	Brief	Symptom	Inventory	(Derogatis	and	Melisaratos,	1983)	and	the	
Mini	 International	 Neuropsychiatric	 Interview	 (Sheehan	 et	 al.,	 1998)	 were	 administered	 to	
participants		who	were	excluded	if	they	met	the	criteria	for	any	psychiatric	diagnosis.	This	study	
was	 approved	 by	 Research	 Ethics	 Committees	 at	 the	 University	 of	 Manchester	 and	 the	
University	of	Cambridge..	Participants	were	reimbursed	for	their	time	and	travel	expenses.	
	
Data from 199 participants were analysed due to one participant's data failing to download. 
Participants’ mean age was 26.66 years (SD = 9.81) and a mean Wechsler Test of Adult Reading 
(WTAR) score of 112.18 (SD = 6.29). The sample consisted of 99 male and 100 female participants, 
half of whom were educated to degree level.  
Experimental	procedure	
Prior	 to	 the	 visit,	 participants	 completed	 five	 questionnaires	 online:	 Big	 Five	 Personality	
Inventory	(John	et	al.,	1991),	Eysenck	Personality	Inventory	(EPQ:	Eysenck	and	Eysenck,	1991),	
the	Barratt	Impulsivity	Scale	(BIS-11:	Patton	et	al.,	1995),	the	UPPS-P	Impulsive	Behaviour	Scale	
(Whiteside	and	Lynam,	2003)	and	the	 trait	section	of	 the	State-Trait	Anxiety	 Inventory	(STAI:	








(Spielberger	 et	 al.,	 1970).	 Wechsler	 Test	 of	 Adult	 Reading	 (Wechsler,	 2008)	 was	 used	 to	
estimate	participants’	 IQ.	Participants	were	seated	 in	a	 in	a	quiet	 testing	room	and	completed	
the	task	on	a	touchscreen	laptop	(Dell	XT3)	using	PsychoPy	software	(Peirce,	2007).		The	moral	
emotions	 task	 was	 administered	 as	 part	 of	 the	 EMOTICOM	 neuropsychological	 test	 battery	
(Bland,	et	al	2016).		
Moral	Emotions	Task	
The	 task	 uses	 cartoons	 to	 depict	 14	 everyday	moral	 scenarios	 which	 were	 partially	 adapted	
from	 previous	 approaches	 that	 used	 text	 based	 vignettes	 to	 convey	 the	 scenarios	 (Seara-
Cardoso	et	al.,	2016).	Half	of	the	scenarios	depicted	intentional	harms	(e.g.	the	agent	blames	the	
victim	for	the	agent’s	breakage)	and	the	other	half	unintentional	(e.g.	the	agent	loses	the	victim’s	
dog).	 Participants	 were	 asked	 to	 imagine	 how	 they	 would	 feel	 in	 the	 situation	 and	 rate	 the	
following	emotions:	guilt,	shame	and	annoyance	on	a	6-point	scale	ranging	from	“not	at	all”	to	
“extremely”	 and	 feeling	 bad	 on	 a	 scale	 of	 6-point	 scale	 ranging	 from	 “bad”	 to	 “good”.	










All	 statistics	 were	 computed	 with	 SPSS	 statistical	 software	 (IBM,	 Version	 20.0).	 Post-hoc	
analyses	were	performed	for	significant	main	effects	using	Bonferroni	correction.	Ratings	from	
the	moral	 emotions	 task	were	normalised	 from	 the	6-point	 likert	 scale	 to	 values	 ranging	0-1.	
Bad	 ratings	 were	 reversed	 scored.	 Data	 were	 then	 entered	 into	 a	 4(moral	 emotion:	 guilt	 vs	
shame	 vs	 annoyance	 vs	 bad)	 x2(agency:	 victim	 vs	 agent)	 x2(intentionality:	 intentional	 vs	








measures	 in	 order	 to	 assess	 how	 ratings	 are	 associated	 with	 other	 psychologically	 relevant	
characteristics,	 as	 well	 as	 age,	 IQ	 and	 years	 in	 education.	 The	 statistical	 significance	 of	 all	
correlations	were	corrected	 for	multiple	 comparisons	(0.05/n;	n		=	 	number	of	 task	variables)	
and	 subsequently	 significant	 levels	 set	 to	 p<0.003.	 Cohen’s	 d	 effect	 size	 was	 calculated	 as	
Cohen’s	 d	 =	 (M2–M1)/SD	 difference.	 	 With	 199	 participants	 we	 had	 90%	 power	 to	 detect	
differences	 between	 conditions	 of	d	 =	 0.23	 at	p	 =	 0.05	 (two-tailed).	 Split-half	 reliability	 was	
computed	using	the	Spearman-Brown	formula	(Wilson,	2010)	after	randomly	splitting	items	in	















they	 felt	 significantly	more	 guilt	 compared	 to	 shame	 [t(198)	 =	 12.39,	p<0.001,	d	 =	 0.88]	 and	













emotion	 x	 intentionality	 [F(2.34,	 461.16)	 =	 22.0,	 p<0.001,ηp2	 =	 0.10)].	 Post-hoc	 analyses	
revealed	 significant	 effects	 of	 emotion	 x	 intentionality	 for	 both	 the	 victim	 [F(2.40,473.24)	 =	
60.91,	p<0.001,ηp2	=	0.24)]	and	agent	[F(1.89,372.00)	=	52.49,	p<0.001,ηp2	=	0.21)]	conditions.	
When	 participants	 took	 on	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 victim	 they	 showed	 significantly	 greater	
ratings	 of	 moral	 emotions	 when	 the	 harm	 was	 intentional	 compared	 to	 unintentional;	 guilt	
[t(198)	=	3.93,	p<0.001,	d	=	2.78],	shame	[t(198)	=	15.70,	p<0.001,	d	=	1.11],	annoyance	[t(198)	
=	 6.86,	 p<0.001,	 d	 =	 0.49],	 and	 bad	 [t(198)	 =	 9.45,	 p<0.001,	 d	 =	 0.67].	 However,	 when	 the	
participant	 took	 on	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 agent	 there	 was	 no	 significant	 difference	 of	













When	 considering	 the	 role	 of	 gender	 there	 was	 a	 significant	 4-way	 gender	 x	 agent	 x	
intentionality	 x	 emotion	 interaction	 [F(2.34,461.16)	 =	 5.83,	 p<0.001,ηp2	 =	 0.03)].	 Post-hoc	
analyses	revealed	a	significant	gender	x	emotion	x	intention	interaction	when	taking	on	the	role	
of	agent	 [F(1.89,372.00)	=	7.76,	p<0.001,ηp2	=	0.04)].	Females,	when	 identifying	as	 the	agent,	
showed	 significantly	 greater	 guilt	 [t(174.89)	 =	 4.02,	 p<0.001,	 d	 =	 0.10]	 and	 shame	 [t(197)	 =	
3.15,	p<0.01,	d	 =	0.12]	 regardless	of	 intentionality.	When	 taking	on	 the	 role	of	 the	victim,	 the	
significant	 gender	 x	 emotion	x	 intention	 interaction	did	not	 survive	Bonferroni	 correction	 for	












participants	 felt	 more	 annoyance	 [r	 =	 0.23,	 p<0.001],	 however,	 we	 observed	 no	 significant	
correlations	with	IQ	[all	p>0.05].	
	
We	 found	 that	EPQ	Psychoticism	was	significantly	 correlated	with	 ratings	of	 agent	guilt	 [r	=	 -
0.34,	p<0.001],	agent	shame	[r	=	-0.37,	p<0.001]	and	agent	bad	[r	=	-0.33,	p<0.001]	regardless	of	
intentionality.	 EPQ-Psychoticism	however	 did	 not	 significantly	 correlate	with	moral	 emotions	
associated	 with	 taking	 the	 role	 of	 the	 victim	 [all	 p>0.10].	 We	 also	 observed	 that	 EPQ-












role	 of	 victim,	 participants	 feel	more	 annoyance.	 Moreover,	 levels	 of	 shame	 are	 greater	 than	
guilt	 when	 identifying	 with	 the	 victim	 whereas	 participants	 report	 greater	 feelings	 of	 guilt	
compared	 to	 shame	 when	 identifying	 with	 the	 agent.	 Our	 results	 further	 show	 that	 when	
participants	took	on	the	perspective	of	the	victim	they	showed	significantly	greater	guilt,	shame,	
annoyance	and	bad	ratings	when	the	harm	was	intentional.	However,	when	the	participant	took	
on	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 agent,	 ratings	 showed	 greater	 shame	 and	 less	 annoyance	 but	 no	
significant	difference	of	intentionality	in	guilt	or	bad	ratings.	
	
Our	 results	 are	 consistent	with	previous	 findings	 that	 support	 the	 idea	 that	different	 types	of	
moral	 emotions	 such	 as	 guilt	 and	 shame	 can	 be	 distinguished	 by	 agency.	 For	 instance,	when	
considering	their	own	wrongdoings,	people	report	more	guilt	than	shame	which	may	facilitate	
reparative	actions	 (Schmader	and	Lickel,	2006).	Guilt	 is	 therefore	 thought	 to	be	an	adaptive	
emotion	promoting	moral	and	prosocial	behaviour	(Tangney	et	al.	1992)	and	thus	preventing	
people	 from	 committing	 transgressions.	 However,	 when	 individuals	 consider	 others’	
wrongdoings	directed	at	them,	they	feel	more	shame	than	guilt	which	is	thought	to	provoke	a	
desire	 to	hide	or	 leave,	 aimed	at	 insulating	oneself	 from	negative	evaluation	 (Schmader	and	
Lickel,	2006).		
	
In	 the	 present	 study	we	 also	 show	 the	 effect	 of	 intentionality	 on	moral	 emotions.	 It	 has	 long	










as	 shame,	 perhaps	 from	 potential	 public	 exposure	 and	 disapproval.	 By	 contrast,	 an	
unintentional	harm	does	not	elicit	such	shameful	feelings.		
	
There	 was	 also	 a	 clear	 effect	 of	 gender	 in	 the	 present	 study.	We	 observed	 that	 females	 had	
heightened	feelings	of	guilt	and	shame	when	taking	on	the	role	of	 the	agent.	This	 finding	 is	 in	
line	with	previous	findings	suggesting	that	gender	affects	the	intensity	and	frequency	of	moral	
affective	 experiences	 (Lutwak	 et	 al.,	 2001).	 Females	 are	 reportedly	more	 likely	 to	 experience	
guilt	and	shame	while	also	engaging	 in	more	prosocial/reparative	behaviours	than	men	(Else-
Quest	 et	 al.	 2012;	 Lutwak	 et	 al.,	 1998;	 Lutwak	 and	 Ferrari	 1996).	 We	 found	 no	 significant	
gender	 effects	 for	 annoyance	 and	 feeling	 bad.	 When	 taking	 on	 the	 role	 of	 victim,	 however,	
females	 showed	 increased	 feelings	 of	 all	 four	 moral	 emotions	 suggesting	 clear	 gender	
differences	in	moral	emotions	regardless	of	intentionality. This	set	of	findings	may	be	useful	in	
understanding	 gender	 differences	 in	 treatment	 outcomes,	 particularly	 in	 terms	 of	 self-blame	
biases	and	their	suggested	link	to	a	vulnerability	to	depression	(Green	et	al.,	2013).	
	
The	 findings	 from	 this	 study	 also	 show	 that	 personality	 variables	 such	 as	 psychoticism	 and	
neuroticism	are	linked	to	moral	emotions.	We	observed	that	agent	guilt,	shame	and	feeling	bad	
were	 negatively	 correlated	 with	 psychoticism,	 a	 personality	 trait	 typified	 by	 aggressiveness,	









et	 al.,	 2016).	We	also	observed	 that	 ratings	of	 agent	 shame	were	 significantly	 correlated	with	





considering	 emotional	 impairments	 commonly	 found	 in	 a	 range	 of	 psychiatric	 disorders	 and	
how	 they	 influence	 the	 way	 individuals	 approach	 judgements	 about	 morality.	 For	 instance,	




1993;	 Stewart	 and	 Shapiro	 2011)	 often	 experience	 an	 exaggerated	 sense	 of	 guilt	 and	
responsibility,	 which	 can	 be	 largely	 inappropriate	 in	 the	 context,	 and	 is	 positively	 related	 to	
severity	of	symptoms	(Salkovskis	et	al.,	2000).	 Indeed,	“feelings	of	guilt”	 is	a	core	symptom	of	
major	depression:	feelings	of	worthlessness	or	excessive	or	inappropriate	guilt	nearly	every	day	
(American	 Psychiatric	 Association,	2000).	 Further,	 delusional	 ideation	 was	 found	 to	 predict	
shameful	feelings	as	a	result	of	intentional	harms	to	the	victim	(Savulich	et	al.,	2018).	Therefore	












26	 years.	 Finally,	 static	 cartoons	 are	 only	 able	 to	 depict	 quite	 simplistic	moral	 scenarios	 and	
therefore	are	unable	to	capture	the	full	complexity	of	moral	situations.	
	
In	 conclusion,	 using	 this	 novel	 test	 of	 moral	 emotion,	 we	 have	 demonstrated	 agency	 and	
intentionality-dependent	 experiences	 of	 guilt,	 shame,	 annoyance	 and	 feeling	 bad,	 which	 are	
sensitive	 to	 both	 gender	 and	 individual	 differences	 in	 personality.	 These	moral	 emotions	 are	
increasingly	 recognised	 as	 powerful	 determinants	 of	 decision-making	 and	by	 highlighting	 the	
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